Every Advertised Public Cheat is NOT safe.

[.MOON.]

Originally Posted by SexGod25

Fear mongering, we've had users cheat with us for years with no bans. I had a user tell me the other day he boosted quite a few accounts to Radiant these past months and sold them with no issues.

Are you BDE? No offense but they aren't talking about dma software and 2pc software. For DMA, I imagine as long as aim device is UD and DMA FW is safe, and your aim/trigger logic isn't ****, then there is low risk

[TransPrincess]

Originally Posted by Sultanq8

Why? Because Riot games - Vanguard Company has Billions of $$$
They have private Staff team that go into UC or here and buy every cheat and detect it, You might last 1 or 2 Months ( if you're really lucky 3 )


if you cheat public in diff game it might be cool and safe you'll last long enough but Val? HELL NAH

so get 2pc cya.

Correct, they monitor these forums and just buy anything that's advertised. You need to get cheats that are under the radar and never advertised. Basically, dead communities that still create cheats are your best bet (assuming they're a competent developer).

You do not need DMA for this game, that's just a misconception. There is an old OG CoD provider (the older cods, not the new ones) who supports this game with a simple external hack and its been UD for 2 years now, no DMA required. I assure you if he ever chose to advertise on this forum it would probably get hit in a week or two.

[Sheintan]

No, this topic is completely nonsense! I developed a cheat, and how can I sell it without advertising lol? For example, I released the private version, and if I don't announce it on elitepvpers, and if my current customers can't afford it, then there's no way around advertising. If you're looking for an undetectable cheat, check out maxicheats.com. Or look at the Valorant cheat topic in my signature. There are more than enough reviews on pages 1 and 2, and not a single bad comment has come up.

Any payment included proof

[DefNot_Toxic]

Originally Posted by Sheintan

No, this topic is completely nonsense! I developed a cheat, and how can I sell it without advertising lol? For example, I released the private version, and if I don't announce it on elitepvpers, and if my current customers can't afford it, then there's no way around advertising. If you're looking for an undetectable cheat, check out maxicheats.com. Or look at the Valorant cheat topic in my signature. There are more than enough reviews on pages 1 and 2, and not a single bad comment has come up.

Any payment included proof

Ik many providers that are out of epvp and still have slots filled

When product is good you dont need spam it

[Sheintan]

Originally Posted by DefNot_Toxic

Ik many providers that are out of epvp and still have slots filled

When product is good you dont need spam it

If you're new to marketing, you need to introduce yourself at that time. I wish customers would come out of nowhere, I’d love that too!

[DefNot_Toxic]

Originally Posted by Sheintan

If you're new to marketing, you need to introduce yourself at that time. I wish customers would come out of nowhere, I’d love that too!

Spamming everywhere just make you looks bs like unnamed

[unnamedtech]

Originally Posted by DefNot_Toxic

Ik many providers that are out of epvp and still have slots filled

When product is good you dont need spam it

bullshit.

Originally Posted by DefNot_Toxic

Spamming everywhere just make you looks bs like unnamed

unnamed still best

[DefNot_Toxic]

Originally Posted by unncheats

bullshit.



unnamed still best

Its not bullshit, ik over 5 providers that dont have AD anywhere and have all slots filled just from friends inviting other friends

Thing is for that cheat need be really good and UD, not like yours that every day someone get "manual" banned


Unnamed never was the better and never will be sorry to say, you are a good option just in your public for people who rage

[uzayatlass]

Originally Posted by DefNot_Toxic

Its not bullshit, ik over 5 providers that dont have AD anywhere and have all slots filled just from friends inviting other friends

Thing is for that cheat need be really good and UD, not like yours that every day someone get "manual" banned


Unnamed never was the better and never will be sorry to say, you are a good option just in your public for people who rage

How can we know if a seller who is not on any forum is trustworthy?

[getnzt]

Beyond the Endless Ban Cycle: Why SMM Is The Only True Undetectable Solution

This highlights a common frustration in the cheating community - the endless cycle of buying "undetectable" cheats, only to be banned days or weeks later. This is especially true with some popular AC solutions that actively purchase public cheats to reverse engineer them.

The harsh reality is that *any* solution operating within the traditional software stack (user mode or kernel mode) or using standard external hardware methods like DMA will likely eventually be detected unless designed in a way that we haven't seen so far in our assessment of public solutions. This isn't opinion - it's an architectural certainty based on how modern computing systems are designed. Is it possible to stay UD with publicly sold builds? Yes, but you're essentially rolling the dice.

But there is a solution that breaks this cycle completely - one that operates in a realm that anti-cheats physically cannot access due to CPU architectural boundaries. That solution is SMM-based firmware modification, and it represents the end-game in the cat-and-mouse battle between cheats and anti-cheats.

Let me explain why SMM (System Management Mode) is fundamentally different from every other method, and why it's the only solution that can truthfully claim to be permanently undetectable by logical design, not just through temporary obfuscation or secrecy.

Understanding the CPU Ring Architecture

To understand why SMM is special, let's break down how modern CPU protection rings work:

• Ring 3 (User mode): Where your applications and games run
• Ring 0 (Kernel mode): Where drivers and the OS kernel operate
• Ring -1 (Hypervisor - Or VTL1/VTL2 W/ HyperV Presence): Where virtual machine monitors like Hyper-V run
• Ring -2 (SMM): System Management Mode - a special CPU mode with complete system access
• Ring -3 (ME/PSP): Intel ME/AMD PSP - the management engine/security processor

Each ring can monitor and control the rings above it, but cannot look "down" into more privileged rings. This is a hardware-enforced limitation, not a software one.

Why Most Solutions Will Eventually Be Detected

1. DMA-Based Solutions (External Hardware)
• Operates by directly reading memory through PCIe/m.2/Thunderbolt
• Detection vectors:
- Memory validation checksums via IOMMU
- Bus master control (can be disabled by OS/AC)
- Device enumeration detection
- Hardware inspection at events
- Modern Windows increasingly restricts DMA access

The DMA Firmware Race to the Bottom

There's been significant buzz about "custom DMA firmware" solutions lately, with claims they're undetectable. Let me break down why this is fundamentally flawed:

1. Still Bound by PCIe Protocol: Even with custom firmware, DMA devices still communicate via PCIe/m.2 protocols that can be monitored. The firmware may be custom, but the electrical signals still follow standard specifications.

2. IOMMU Barrier: Intel VT-d and AMD-Vi technologies specifically exist to create memory isolation against DMA attacks. OS-level protections can restrict what memory a PCIe device can access, regardless of its firmware.

3. Windows DMA Protection: Recent Windows versions implement Kernel DMA Protection that blocks unauthorized DMA access, even from firmware-modified devices. As Windows tightens these controls, DMA devices must increasingly use detectable workarounds.

4. Device Enumeration: Any PCIe device, regardless of firmware, must still announce itself to the PCIe bus. Anti-cheats can monitor for unexpected PCIe/m.2 devices or unexpected behavior from known devices.

5. Memory Transaction Patterns: Even with stealthy firmware, DMA devices create detectable memory transaction patterns. Anti-cheats can monitor memory bus activity for suspicious read patterns.

6. Physical Requirement: DMA requires a physical device connected to your system. This creates a tangible detection vector, particularly at competitive events where hardware is inspected.

7. Update Arms Race: Custom firmware can be fingerprinted and detected once anti-cheat vendors obtain a sample. This forces continuous updates that inevitably leave detection windows.

What we're seeing with custom DMA firmware is simply the same cat-and-mouse game but with slightly higher technical barriers. It's not a fundamental change to the detection paradigm - it's just raising the technical sophistication level in a race that will continue downward.

This is distinctly different from SMM, which operates outside the entire paradigm by leveraging CPU architecture boundaries that cannot be crossed.

2. Hypervisor/VM Solutions
• Operates at Ring -1, placing games in a VM
• Detection vectors:
- CPU timing discrepancies
- Hypervisor presence detection
- TLB flushing measurements
- Memory access patterns
- CPUID instruction behavior alterations
- XSETBV/INVD/WBINVD and other tricks

3. Kernel Drivers (EV Certificates)
• Operates at Ring 0, using signed drivers
• Detection vectors:
- Certificate can be revoked
- Driver behavior monitoring
- Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) improvements
- Memory scanning by anti-cheats
- Driver behavior blacklisting

The Undetectable Realm: SMM Firmware

SMM (System Management Mode) operates at Ring -2, a special CPU mode that exists below the operating system, below the kernel, and even below hypervisors. When the CPU enters SMM mode:

1. Complete Memory Access: SMM has unrestricted access to all physical memory, regardless of protection

2. Architectural Invisibility: The OS cannot detect when SMM mode is active - this is a fundamental limitation by design

3. Privileged Execution: SMM code executes with higher privileges than any anti-cheat can ever obtain

4. SBMA Capability: SMM Baseboard Memory Access allows for memory modifications that are completely invisible to any software running on the system

Why SMM Cannot Be Detected: Technical Deep Dive

The crucial thing to understand is that SMM detection is not just "difficult" - it is architecturally impossible without physical hardware modifications to the CPU itself. Here's why:

1. CPU State Preservation: When SMM is triggered, the CPU automatically saves its entire state, executes SMM code, then restores that exact state before returning control. There is no software-accessible record of this happening. You could track SMI's or similar callers/conventions - but that would require a UM/KM/HV implementation thats making these calls directly to be dumped by the AC. Would likely require a UEFI bootkit type AC in order to reference returning SMM calls in the SMM UEFI Buffer, but thats easily bypassed if you understand SMM.

2. Memory Access Without Traces: SMM can read/write any memory without using the standard memory controllers that anti-cheats monitor. It's like a ghost that can touch everything but cannot be touched.

3. Hardware Emulation: SMM can directly control hardware I/O ports, meaning it can send mouse/keyboard inputs that are indistinguishable from real physical inputs.

4. Perfect Information Hiding: SMM doesn't need to install any software, drivers, or hooks that anti-cheats scan for. The firmware modification exists outside the scope of what Windows or any anti-cheat can inspect.

SMM vs. Custom DMA: The Fundamental Difference

To clarify why SMM isn't just "another method" like custom DMA firmware:

• DMA operates through the system via PCIe/m.2 buses that the system manages and can monitor
• SMM operates below the system with direct CPU/memory access that the system cannot detect

It's like comparing a thief who must enter through doors and windows (which can be monitored) versus a ghost that can pass through walls undetected. They're fundamentally different approaches.

Practical Implications: The Final Solution

What does this mean practically? It means that while other solutions are engaged in an endless cat-and-mouse game with anti-cheats, SMM firmware solutions operate in a realm where the cat physically cannot go.

The only way to detect an SMM-based cheat is through behavioral analysis - essentially watching gameplay for suspicious patterns, exactly like "the old days" of manual reviews. This means:

• No automated bans are possible
• Only blatant behavior can trigger manual reviews
• Subtle usage remains completely undetectable
• No client-side detection is possible, ever

Will There Be Alternatives If SMM Gets "Patched"?

Yes, but they would require fundamental hardware changes to CPU architecture itself. Even then, new variants will emerge:

• UEFI-based solutions operating in other protected modes
• Attacking via ME/PSP (Ring -3)
• Custom chipset firmware modifications
• Co-processor implementations

The security industry has been trying to fully secure SMM for decades without complete success - and that's with unlimited resources from Intel, AMD, and major security firms.

Conclusion: Not All Methods Are Equal

While it's generally true that "public" methods tend to get detected faster, SMM solutions occupy a unique position due to architectural boundaries. This isn't about clever coding - it's about operating in a realm that anti-cheats fundamentally cannot access due to hardware-enforced limitations.

Yes, usermode solutions still exist (and we've built some) but these solutions are essentially "AC 0Days" meaning if they get shared/sold AC's will easily reverse and figure out the exploit being used, and kernel solutions will continue to work for periods of time, but they all exist in a detectable realm. They're playing the detection cat-and-mouse game, while SMM solutions are playing an entirely different game where the mouse is protected by physical barriers the cat cannot breach.

The real question isn't "will SMM get detected?" (it won't), but rather "will game developers resort to intrusive physical monitoring?" - and that's a red line most legitimate game companies won't cross.

Feel free to ask technical questions if you're interested in the deeper architectural aspects of why SMM is the end-game in this space.

[DefNot_Toxic]

Originally Posted by uzayatlass

How can we know if a seller who is not on any forum is trustworthy?

Usually they have more rep than any guys where, you prob will know then because a FRIEND told you, so you dont need to worry about it

Originally Posted by getnzt

Beyond the Endless Ban Cycle: Why SMM Is The Only True Undetectable Solution

This highlights a common frustration in the cheating community - the endless cycle of buying "undetectable" cheats, only to be banned days or weeks later. This is especially true with some popular AC solutions that actively purchase public cheats to reverse engineer them.

The harsh reality is that *any* solution operating within the traditional software stack (user mode or kernel mode) or using standard external hardware methods like DMA will likely eventually be detected unless designed in a way that we haven't seen so far in our assessment of public solutions. This isn't opinion - it's an architectural certainty based on how modern computing systems are designed. Is it possible to stay UD with publicly sold builds? Yes, but you're essentially rolling the dice.

But there is a solution that breaks this cycle completely - one that operates in a realm that anti-cheats physically cannot access due to CPU architectural boundaries. That solution is SMM-based firmware modification, and it represents the end-game in the cat-and-mouse battle between cheats and anti-cheats.

Let me explain why SMM (System Management Mode) is fundamentally different from every other method, and why it's the only solution that can truthfully claim to be permanently undetectable by logical design, not just through temporary obfuscation or secrecy.

Understanding the CPU Ring Architecture

To understand why SMM is special, let's break down how modern CPU protection rings work:

• Ring 3 (User mode): Where your applications and games run
• Ring 0 (Kernel mode): Where drivers and the OS kernel operate
• Ring -1 (Hypervisor - Or VTL1/VTL2 W/ HyperV Presence): Where virtual machine monitors like Hyper-V run
• Ring -2 (SMM): System Management Mode - a special CPU mode with complete system access
• Ring -3 (ME/PSP): Intel ME/AMD PSP - the management engine/security processor

Each ring can monitor and control the rings above it, but cannot look "down" into more privileged rings. This is a hardware-enforced limitation, not a software one.

Why Most Solutions Will Eventually Be Detected

1. DMA-Based Solutions (External Hardware)
• Operates by directly reading memory through PCIe/m.2/Thunderbolt
• Detection vectors:
- Memory validation checksums via IOMMU
- Bus master control (can be disabled by OS/AC)
- Device enumeration detection
- Hardware inspection at events
- Modern Windows increasingly restricts DMA access

The DMA Firmware Race to the Bottom

There's been significant buzz about "custom DMA firmware" solutions lately, with claims they're undetectable. Let me break down why this is fundamentally flawed:

1. Still Bound by PCIe Protocol: Even with custom firmware, DMA devices still communicate via PCIe/m.2 protocols that can be monitored. The firmware may be custom, but the electrical signals still follow standard specifications.

2. IOMMU Barrier: Intel VT-d and AMD-Vi technologies specifically exist to create memory isolation against DMA attacks. OS-level protections can restrict what memory a PCIe device can access, regardless of its firmware.

3. Windows DMA Protection: Recent Windows versions implement Kernel DMA Protection that blocks unauthorized DMA access, even from firmware-modified devices. As Windows tightens these controls, DMA devices must increasingly use detectable workarounds.

4. Device Enumeration: Any PCIe device, regardless of firmware, must still announce itself to the PCIe bus. Anti-cheats can monitor for unexpected PCIe/m.2 devices or unexpected behavior from known devices.

5. Memory Transaction Patterns: Even with stealthy firmware, DMA devices create detectable memory transaction patterns. Anti-cheats can monitor memory bus activity for suspicious read patterns.

6. Physical Requirement: DMA requires a physical device connected to your system. This creates a tangible detection vector, particularly at competitive events where hardware is inspected.

7. Update Arms Race: Custom firmware can be fingerprinted and detected once anti-cheat vendors obtain a sample. This forces continuous updates that inevitably leave detection windows.

What we're seeing with custom DMA firmware is simply the same cat-and-mouse game but with slightly higher technical barriers. It's not a fundamental change to the detection paradigm - it's just raising the technical sophistication level in a race that will continue downward.

This is distinctly different from SMM, which operates outside the entire paradigm by leveraging CPU architecture boundaries that cannot be crossed.

2. Hypervisor/VM Solutions
• Operates at Ring -1, placing games in a VM
• Detection vectors:
- CPU timing discrepancies
- Hypervisor presence detection
- TLB flushing measurements
- Memory access patterns
- CPUID instruction behavior alterations
- XSETBV/INVD/WBINVD and other tricks

3. Kernel Drivers (EV Certificates)
• Operates at Ring 0, using signed drivers
• Detection vectors:
- Certificate can be revoked
- Driver behavior monitoring
- Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) improvements
- Memory scanning by anti-cheats
- Driver behavior blacklisting

The Undetectable Realm: SMM Firmware

SMM (System Management Mode) operates at Ring -2, a special CPU mode that exists below the operating system, below the kernel, and even below hypervisors. When the CPU enters SMM mode:

1. Complete Memory Access: SMM has unrestricted access to all physical memory, regardless of protection

2. Architectural Invisibility: The OS cannot detect when SMM mode is active - this is a fundamental limitation by design

3. Privileged Execution: SMM code executes with higher privileges than any anti-cheat can ever obtain

4. SBMA Capability: SMM Baseboard Memory Access allows for memory modifications that are completely invisible to any software running on the system

Why SMM Cannot Be Detected: Technical Deep Dive

The crucial thing to understand is that SMM detection is not just "difficult" - it is architecturally impossible without physical hardware modifications to the CPU itself. Here's why:

1. CPU State Preservation: When SMM is triggered, the CPU automatically saves its entire state, executes SMM code, then restores that exact state before returning control. There is no software-accessible record of this happening. You could track SMI's or similar callers/conventions - but that would require a UM/KM/HV implementation thats making these calls directly to be dumped by the AC. Would likely require a UEFI bootkit type AC in order to reference returning SMM calls in the SMM UEFI Buffer, but thats easily bypassed if you understand SMM.

2. Memory Access Without Traces: SMM can read/write any memory without using the standard memory controllers that anti-cheats monitor. It's like a ghost that can touch everything but cannot be touched.

3. Hardware Emulation: SMM can directly control hardware I/O ports, meaning it can send mouse/keyboard inputs that are indistinguishable from real physical inputs.

4. Perfect Information Hiding: SMM doesn't need to install any software, drivers, or hooks that anti-cheats scan for. The firmware modification exists outside the scope of what Windows or any anti-cheat can inspect.

SMM vs. Custom DMA: The Fundamental Difference

To clarify why SMM isn't just "another method" like custom DMA firmware:

• DMA operates through the system via PCIe/m.2 buses that the system manages and can monitor
• SMM operates below the system with direct CPU/memory access that the system cannot detect

It's like comparing a thief who must enter through doors and windows (which can be monitored) versus a ghost that can pass through walls undetected. They're fundamentally different approaches.

Practical Implications: The Final Solution

What does this mean practically? It means that while other solutions are engaged in an endless cat-and-mouse game with anti-cheats, SMM firmware solutions operate in a realm where the cat physically cannot go.

The only way to detect an SMM-based cheat is through behavioral analysis - essentially watching gameplay for suspicious patterns, exactly like "the old days" of manual reviews. This means:

• No automated bans are possible
• Only blatant behavior can trigger manual reviews
• Subtle usage remains completely undetectable
• No client-side detection is possible, ever

Will There Be Alternatives If SMM Gets "Patched"?

Yes, but they would require fundamental hardware changes to CPU architecture itself. Even then, new variants will emerge:

• UEFI-based solutions operating in other protected modes
• Attacking via ME/PSP (Ring -3)
• Custom chipset firmware modifications
• Co-processor implementations

The security industry has been trying to fully secure SMM for decades without complete success - and that's with unlimited resources from Intel, AMD, and major security firms.

Conclusion: Not All Methods Are Equal

While it's generally true that "public" methods tend to get detected faster, SMM solutions occupy a unique position due to architectural boundaries. This isn't about clever coding - it's about operating in a realm that anti-cheats fundamentally cannot access due to hardware-enforced limitations.

Yes, usermode solutions still exist (and we've built some) but these solutions are essentially "AC 0Days" meaning if they get shared/sold AC's will easily reverse and figure out the exploit being used, and kernel solutions will continue to work for periods of time, but they all exist in a detectable realm. They're playing the detection cat-and-mouse game, while SMM solutions are playing an entirely different game where the mouse is protected by physical barriers the cat cannot breach.

The real question isn't "will SMM get detected?" (it won't), but rather "will game developers resort to intrusive physical monitoring?" - and that's a red line most legitimate game companies won't cross.

Feel free to ask technical questions if you're interested in the deeper architectural aspects of why SMM is the end-game in this space.

Stop using chat gpt, you are dumb ?

TAKE CARE with that guy, if you ever want to try USE MIDDLEMAN

brand new account, all posts using chatgpt, and his unique vouch is also using chat gpt, weird not ?

[Dev7]

Originally Posted by Sultanq8

Why? Because Riot games - Vanguard Company has Billions of $$$
They have private Staff team that go into UC or here and buy every cheat and detect it, You might last 1 or 2 Months ( if you're really lucky 3 )

Nobody says this in val section, I've had enough of BS of every Greedy seller that claims to be UD and then after you get your key you enjoy few days and come back to them they say * M a n u a l C h e c k *

Trust me its not manual, I've been using DMA 2pc and hardware 2pc im cheating for 3-4 months now

So Short story, I was an idiot newbie noob here few years ago, bought cheats got banned the story continues on HWID Loop Until i realized that everyone here is the same 40$ cheat 500$ cheat AS LONG AS ITS IN VGK.exe RADAR IT WILL BE DETECTED!!!!!



oh lemme say my user experience ( Strafe banned after 6 matches i used their ESP-AIM external slotted )
( AdvanceAim new Sticky Thread dude with many trades i used his software for few games also banned)

and the past few years ago i used many cheats in val and other games

if you cheat public in diff game it might be cool and safe you'll last long enough but Val? HELL NAH

so get 2pc cya.

You don’t know what you talking about. Unnamed has been UD since release. Your delulu boy, delulu 2PC fanboy. Delulu with no slululu

Originally Posted by unncheats

bullshit.



unnamed still best

LOL, UNNAMED IS HERE. UD SINCE REALEASE. Please, bro. Say your catch phrase

[Garfield_]

Basically in this game, you should only go for private cheats as most public cheats are detected

[.MOON.]

Originally Posted by Garfield_

Basically in this game, you should only go for private cheats as most public cheats are detected

Objection! DMA software and 2PC cb and AI are certainly safe!

I would argue that getting a private is unrealistic and the best solution is either DMA (detection vectors are the card fw, and the aim device), or a 2pc ai/cb (detection vector is aim device).

Apart from the actual hardware and firmware costs, they are not bad solutions.

[DefNot_Toxic]

Originally Posted by .MOON.

Objection! DMA software and 2PC cb and AI are certainly safe!

I would argue that getting a private is unrealistic and the best solution is either DMA (detection vectors are the card fw, and the aim device), or a 2pc ai/cb (detection vector is aim device).

Apart from the actual hardware and firmware costs, they are not bad solutions.

Softwares cant get detect because is on other PC, but have other vectors that can be detect easy